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1 Over the last decade populism has emerged as a frequently key notion when analyzing
political and social evolutions in a large number of European and American countries.
Its usage, however, is on the whole negative in that more often than not, it designates a
direct  appeal  to  the  people  based  on  the  resentment  of  elites  and/or  other  social
groups  while  at  the  same  time  advocating  a  ragbag  of  so-called  “simple”  and
demagogical measures. It is a notion mainly used to denounce adversaries and there
are few political  figures  —with the exception of  Jean-Luc Mélenchon,  leader  of  the
France Insoumise party, Hugo Chavez, or Podemos leaders in Spain (Chazel L., 2019)—
who  actually  lay  claim  to  the  label  with  any  pride1.  In  other  words,  populism  is
primarily  perceived  as  a  degraded  form  of  political  life  in  a  democracy.  Studying
populism  in  that  light,  Pierre  Rosanvallon  (2011)  sees  it  in  terms  of  a  threefold
simplification, as a political simplification pitting a phantasmatic, homogenous people
against corrupt elites, as an institutional simplification rejecting any counter-balancing
of the popular will and as a social simplification conferring on the people a clear and
clearly defined identity2.
2 Populism is  also  a  notion that  comes with a  variety  of  styles  and practices.  In  the
Americas it has been invoked in recent times in reference to highly varied political
currents  and outlooks,  designating movements,  political  players  even governments,
such as Occupy Wall Street, the Tea Party, Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump. In Latin
America,  the term has applied particularly to regimes,  also referred to as national-
populist:  Chavist-led  Venezuela,  Bolivia  under  Evo  Morales  or  Argentina  under  the
Kirchner governments; at the same time, it is used to designate such ultra-conservative
movements as that of Jair Bolsonaro, the current president of Brazil or the neo-liberal
governments of the nineties (Fujimori in Peru, Collor de Mello in Brazil, Bucaram in
Ecuador…).  While  governed by  “strong men”,  elected in  crisis  circumstances,  these
latter regimes also resurrected appeal-to-the-people practices involving an unmediated
link with society by new means (via television, for example, in the nineties, via internet
in  the  present  day)  and strong physical  images  of  power,  direct  inheritors  as  they
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sometimes were of older populist organizations (Menem in Argentina). But in as much
as they have abandoned the redistributive policies and the practice of intervention in
the economy characteristic of the “old populisms” in Latin America, they can be seen as
manifestations of “neopulism”, defined as the fusion of populism and neo-liberalism
that they evince (Freindeberg F., 2007).
3 Given such variety, many are disinclined to recognize any substance in the notion of
populism: if,  then,  it  is  not  grounded ideologically,  it  whittles  down to its  multiple
usages. And its ubiquity does indeed provide cover for a certain conceptual confusion
(Mudde C., 2007, Hermet G., 2001, Taguieff P-A., 1997, Laclau E., 2004), compounded by
the fact that populism may be seen as the shadow of democracy itself (Arditi B., 2004,
Canovan M., 1999). Hence, though current populisms certainly vehicle the spectacle of
democracy tottering under the weight of economic and social pressures, with demands
centering on national identity and security, the attendant denunciation of elites and
the defense of the people-as-virtuous, their actual substance remains unclear. This is
the case firstly because the discursive levels of actors on the one hand and political or
social science analysts on the other become mixed up in debate, and secondly because
the  transnational,  multifarious  nature  of  the  phenomenon  tends  to  mask  real
differences in national occurrences. The history of populism in Europe, for instance,
differs greatly from its history in the United States, in Canada or in Latin America. On
the Old Continent, populism has to do generally with far right movements (Mudde C.,
2007), or else, as Georg Lavau (1970) puts it, with a “tribunistic function” of left-wing
parties.  But  in  the United States,  home to  the eponymous Popular  Party,  populism
involves  a  political  discourse  of  egalitarianism derived  directly  from  the  American
Revolution (Kazin M., 1995). Again, in Latin America, often considered as populism’s
“chosen  land”  (Hermet  G.,  2001),  a  fact  which  might  well  make  it  a  “paradigm  of
modern populism” (Dorma A., 1999), the term designates not so much a “denunciative”
or  an  “oppositional”  (Rosanvallon  P.,  2011)  populism  but  rather  a  populism  of
government, the diverse manifestations of which have left a deep mark on the 20th
century history of  the subcontinent  (Marques Pereira  B.,  Garibay D.,  2011)  and the
heritage of which has remained potent in the opening decades of the third millennium.
However, the “frequency” and the “imprecision” of the concept require a honing of the
context  in  which  it  is  used,  leading  to  a  pluralistic  perception  of  movements  and
historically situated regimes all the more necessary in as much as no-one, with a few
rare exceptions, “calls themselves populist or claims to be so” (Rouquié A., [1987] 1998).
4 Populism in the US has deep roots going back to the foundation of the country. Seen
theoretically,  the  affinities  between  this,  the  first  country  whose  constitution
stipulated, in 1787, “We The People… Do” and populism, which lays claim to the basic
principles of democracy (majority rule and popular sovereignty), confirm the extent to
which populism does indeed follow democracy like its shadow (Arditi B., 2004). Yet the
relationship between the two is fraught with tension, as the history of the United States
abundantly attests. As early as 1780, the federalist Founding Fathers were denouncing
the “tyranny of the majority”, an expression which is widely echoed in contemporary
meanings conveyed by “populism”. It was to counteract this dreaded tyranny that the
constitution conceived by James Madison and the delegates to Philadelphia set up a
multiplicity of “checks and balances”. Since then, any number of populist movements,
left  or  right  wing,  have  criticized  these  institutional  “counterweights”  as  so  many
means of muzzling the voice of the people. Populist movements, as Yves Mény and Yves
Surel  (2002)  have  written,  all  share  the  idea  that  democracy  means  one  thing,  the
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power  of  the  people.  In  consequence  of  which,  they  are  quick  to  exploit  the  gap
between democratic ideals —one example being the famous Lincoln quote from 1863 in
praise  of  “government  of,  by,  for  the  people”—  and  the  elitist  functioning  of
representative  democracy  as  analyzed by  successive  political  thinkers  and “realist”
theoreticians from Joseph Schumpeter to Robert Dahl or Giovanni Sartori, not omitting
Bernard Manin. This critical stance has been a constant presence in American political
life,  resurfacing  at  regular  intervals,  with,  however,  one  singular  unifying
characteristic, the fact that populists never criticize the constitution itself. They might
call for constitutional reform (the case on the left) or demand greater respect of the
constitution (the case on the right), but they never seek its abolition.
5 The  particularity  of  the  US  lies  also  in  the  fact  the  populism  is  associated  with
progressive  movements,  whereas  in  European  democracies  populisms  are
overwhelmingly  right  wing.  The  first  use  of  the  term “populism” was  indeed by  a
Kansas journalist  in 1890,  in reference to the People’s  Party,  a  third political  party
which became a major political force with over 8 % of the vote in the 1892 presidential
election. The emergence of this protest movement in the heart of rural America at a
time of transition from an individual owner capitalism towards a capitalism dominated
by  large  corporations  has  given  rise  to  wide  historiographical  debate.  Richard
Hofstader,  taking  his  cue  from  the  Frankfurt  School,  portrayed  populism  as  an
irrational, pathological reaction against economic modernization. It exemplified in his
opinion  the  “paranoid  style”  of  American  political  life,  the  potential  of  which  was
illustrated by the libertarian right as traduced by Goldwater (Hofstader R., 1955, 1964).
Historians following the lead of  Lawrence Goodwyn effectively  disputed this  thesis,
pointing out the extent of the movement’s democratic impregnation, with its strong
associative component and legislative influence visible not only in the first laws setting
out factory worker rights but even in certain New Deal enactments (Goodwyn L., 1978,
Postels C., 2007, Sanders E., 1999). Although in the 1930s populism took on threatening,
even fascist-like tones, with men like Huey Long and Father Coughlin, it retained, as
Alan Brinkley has shown, a democratic dimension and incited Roosevelt and the New
Dealers to promulgate important social reforms (Brinkley A., 1982).
6 The  difficulty  posed  by  the  analysis  of  populism in  the  US  derives  from the  great
complexity of  its  manifestations throughout the 20th century.  For Michael  Kazin,  a
careful distinction must be made between the People’s Party and the populist language
(in  the  sense  that  historian  Gareth  Stedman  Jones  provides  for  this  term)  that  it
bequeathed to American political life. Setting the people, virtuous and hard-working,
representing the essence of America, against a parasitical elite that threatens it, this
language functions, argues Kazin, as a substitute for an assumed rhetoric of class, but it
is not exclusive to the Democrats and the American left since, starting in the 1950s,
populism became an essential ingredient in the reconfiguration of the American right
which began to use the same rhetoric to condemn progressive intellectual elites and
their social engineering projects, thereby appealing to a section of the working class
electorate. In a context of growing tensions arising from conflicts to do with racial and
gender discrimination in the work place, from the culture wars and the economic crisis
of the 70s, populism became a defensive rampart for white, conservative America. From
George Wallace to Ronald Reagan and Pat Buchanan, this right wing populism sang the
praises of working America while occasionally sniping at K Street lobbies, but both its
ideological content and its relationship to social class were ambiguous and led in the
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end to reforms enacted in the interest of the economic elites, thus participating in the
rise of neoliberalism (Kazin M., 1995, 2017, Frank T., 2004).
7 Overall,  the  forcefulness  of  populism  in  the  US  is  a  factor  of  the  absence  of  any
important  Marxist  tradition  —the  marginalization  of  Marxism  after  the  Bolshevik
revolution was compounded by the Cold War— and of the resulting discredit attached
to  arguments  involving  class.  However  populism’s  plasticity  and  its  right  leaning
anchorage over the last sixty years suggest the need to clarify its links with the political
and social history of peri-urban America and the anti-state ethos of the middle classes
which there form the Republican party’s electoral base (McGirr L., 2001).
8 This being so, it is no easy task to insert Donald Trump into the weave of American
populism, which is perhaps why many observers tend to revert to Hofstader’s theory
which currently has a new impetus. Trump was written off by many as an anomaly of
US political life, having conquered the Republican party and gained the presidency by
virtue of mere circumstance. But the Trump phenomenon is rather more complex than
such explanations allow for, notably because his electorate, in spite of local shifts in the
rust  belt,  corresponds  to  the  traditional  Republican  electorate  and  also  because
Trump’s position on immigration and in favor of protectionism echoes policies carried
out  by  the  Republicans  since  the  end  of  the  19th  century.  Coming  after  years  of
populist-leaning conservative mobilization, Trump may well represent a bleeding out
of the “conservative revolution” of the last decades. But more especially he is a perfect
example of what P-A Taguieff defines as a populisme-attitude, a posturing populism
(1997, p. 15), independent from more or less structured visions or traditions, politically
indeterminate, but idealizing the “popular”. Furthermore, the Trump administration
constitutes a crucial stage in the American history of populism in that populism is no
longer a mere extra-institutional movement, it sits square at the heart of power.
9 In Latin America,  on the other hand,  the experience of  populism in government is
greater by far. The context in which the term populism emerged has to do with the
development of social science throughout the sub-continent at the end of the 1950s and
the beginning of the 60s. Sociologists and political theorists appropriated the concept
in order to analyze the authoritative, nationalist regimes that inaugurated the policies
of  regulation and redistribution characterizing the sequence that had just  unfolded
(Quattrocchi-Woisson D., 1997). Initially applied to Peronism in Argentina (Germani G.,
1962 ; di Tella T., 1964) and to Getulism in Brazil (Cardoso F., Weffort F. (eds), 1970), the
concept was rapidly extended throughout the entire sub-continent in order to deal
with situations in the 1920-1960 period in which political parties (such as the APRA in
Peru,  the  Febrerist  party  in  Paraguay,  the  RNM  in  Bolivia),  leaders  never  having
exercised power (Cesar Sandino in Nicaragua, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in Colombia), and
governments (post-revolutionary Mexico, Gualberto Villaroel in Bolivia, Velasco Ibarra
in Ecuador)  produced responses to the dual  institutional  (a  democratic  fiction)  and
economic  (the  agro-export  model)  crisis  of  oligarchic  republics.  The  common
denominator here was the central inscription of the “people” in mobilization discourse,
from the Peronist descamisados in Argentine to the olivados in Ecuador under Velasco
Ibarra,  to  the  “poor”  and  their  “father”  Vargas  in  Brazil,  to  the  Colorado  party’s
“barefeet” (py nandí) in Paraguay.
10 Beyond  all  the  diverse  national  experiences,  several  elements  may  be  invoked  to
characterize the singular nature and the historicity of these Latin American populisms.
As  a  general  rule,  leadership  was  sustained  by  a  democratic  dynamic  linked  to
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extensions  of  suffrage.  Leaders  initiated  developmentalist  policies  based  on  state
regulation  and  social  redistribution.  Mobilization  discourse  depended  on  a  dual
polarization: the people against the elites,  the nation against all  imperialism. These
were indeed mobilizing regimes, in tune with social movements and based on effective
trade  union  and/or  partisan  cadres.  For  the  most  part,  they  entered  upon  limited
transformations  of  socio-economic  structures  where  nationalizations  of  strategic
sectors  were  rarely  accompanied  by  corollary  agrarian  reform.  Consequently,  they
achieved fragile equilibrium by setting up a “State of compromise” aimed at preserving
the property of the elites while responding in part to the social hopes and expectations
of the popular and middle classes.
11 These “transitional” regimes which attempted to “integrate popular sectors into the
political order” (Rouquié A., 1998) represented an essential stage in the construction of
democratic  process  in  Latin  America.  The calling  of  elections  and the  extension of
suffrage were part and parcel of Peron’s accession to power by in Argentine in 1946 and
1952, of Estenssoro’s in Bolivia in 1952 and of the return of Vargas in Brazil in 1951. In
this  way,  the  “populist”  governments  of  Latin  America  generally  initiated  and
maintained the  indigenist  policies  of  the  first  half  century  with  the  perspective  of
weaving their nation more closely together and crystalizing a sense of national identity
rooted in territory and founded on autochthony but also of  integrating all  popular
sectors,  Indian,  Afro-Latino  American  (Andrews  G.R.,  2007)  or  immigrant  in  origin.
However, the diverse conflicts of the 60s revealed the ideological limits of the historic
Latin  American  populisms.  The  Cuban  revolutionary  way  and  the  quest  for  social
change,  of  which  agrarian  reform  was  one  of  the  key  elements,  destroyed  the
equilibrium obtained by the State of compromise and broke up populist movements
whose unity frequently depended on nothing more than the expression of loyalty to
the leader. The Cold War dictatorships of the 70s then proclaimed their intention of
jettisoning the “populist aberration” (Quattrocchi Woisson D., 1997).
12 The reformist governments of the 2000-2010 period, though often called “populist” by
their critics, can only be considered in a very limited measure as the inheritors of the
20th  century  regimes  and  any  filiation  with  the  “old  populisms”  is  even  more
problematic  with regard to contemporary “neopulisms” attempting to articulate an
appeal to the people with neoliberal policies favoring big corporations. The reformist
governments  were  nevertheless  initially  the  fruit  both  of  the  consolidations  of
democracy,  which  put  an  end  to  the  Cold  War  dictatorships,  and  the  practice  of
alternation rendered necessary as a result of the social crisis brought about by two
decades  of  structural  adjustment  policies  and  neoliberal  deregulation.  Aside  from
redistributive  policies  and  the  real  action  against  poverty  conducted  by  left  wing
governments in the 2000s, certain leaders have indeed resumed the practice of divisive
personal  power  and  unmediated  relationship  with  “the  people”,  while  articulating
governmental  action with  base  organizations  which are  associative,  community-  or
union-based,  or  part  of  local  administration.  These  factors  may  be  seen  as
characteristic of a new Latin-American populism. But, in contrast to their polyclassist
and  “national-popular”  predecessors,  reformist  regimes  have  functioned  in  a
consolidated democratic  context  and position themselves  clearly  to  the  left  on  the
national and international boards of players.
13 All this being so, is there a populist model? an American populist model? Or should we
rather  speak  in  terms  of  a  laboratory  of  the  Americas,  with  is  diverse  populist
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experiences  and  its  many  national  specificities,  placing  particular  emphasis  on
questions  such  as  the  links  between  populism  and  the  construction  of  democracy,
between populism and electoralism, between populism and popular participation?
14 This  issue  of  IdeAs  proposes  an  off-center  approach  to  the  problem  by  bringing
together  studies  situated  locally  thereby  showing  how  historians,  sociologists  and
political  theorists  working on North and South America make use of  the notion of
populism with regard to social, political and economic phenomenon for which it may
account. What in a democracy differentiates populism from the appeal for votes made
to electors, and in particular those of the popular classes? As Yves Mény and Yves Surel
have written (2002), populist movements express themselves and indeed behave as if
democracy is reducible to the power of the people. But that is an overall diagnostic and
requires  finer  definition in  as  much as  populisms,  far  from being systematically  in
opposition to the sophistications of liberal, representative democracy (Manin B., 2005),
must be conjugated along a continuum. The forms populism can assume may well at
times be toxic for democracy, but at other times they may bring to life what James
Monroe (1990)  calls  the “democratic  wish”.  Thus,  as  Joseph Lowndes puts  it  in  the
chapter he contributes to the Oxford Handbook of Populism (2017), “it is perhaps better
then to analyze not what populism was but what populism did”. The aim in this issue is
therefore,  in  that  perspective,  to  make  a  contribution  to  the  characterization  of
populist  criteria  using  experiences  and studies  relating  to  the  American continent,
from Canada to the Southern Cone.
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